

Identification and Counterfactuals in Dynamic Models of Market Entry and Exit

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Virginia, Nov. 15, 2012

Introduction: Context

- This paper deals with a fundamental **identification problem** in the estimation of **models of industry dynamics / market entry-exit**.
- These models are useful to study empirical questions that require to take into account **endogeneity and dynamics of market structure**.
- Examples of recent applications:
 - *Ryan (2012): environmental regulation in the cement industry;*
 - *Kryukov (2010): relationship market structure & innovation;*
 - *Sweeting (2011): radio industry & copyright fees;*
 - *Suzuki (2012): hotel industry & land use regulation;*

Introduction: Structural models of market entry-exit

- Two components in profit function: **variable profit** & **fixed profit**.
- **Parameters in variable-profit** (i.e., demand and variable cost parameters) are estimated using data on firms' quantities & prices, a demand system, and a static model of Cournot/Bertrand competition.
- The **fixed profit** is the part that comes from **buying, selling, or renting inputs** that are **fixed** during the whole active life of the firm.
- **Parameters in fixed-profit** are estimated using data on firms' decisions to be active in the market combined with the dynamic model of market entry-exit. **Revealed preference**.

Introduction: The identification problem in this paper

- The fixed-profit function has three components:
 - **Entry cost:** *Paid by new entrants. Includes transaction costs related to market entry, & cost of purchasing owned fixed inputs;*
 - **Scrap value:** *Received by exiting firms. Includes value of selling owned fixed inputs, minus transaction costs related to exit;*
 - **Fixed cost of an incumbent:** *Paid every period by firms that continue in the market. Includes cost of leasing fixed inputs, and taxes related to fixed inputs (e.g., property taxes).*
- These three functions are **not separately identified**.
- Standard approach: **"normalization" of one function to zero.**

Introduction: Contributions of this project

- 1 Derive **closed-form relationship** between three unknown structural functions & two functions identified from the data.

This provides the **correct interpretation** of the estimated objects that are obtained under the '**normalization assumptions**'.

- 2 Characterize a class of counterfactual exp. that is **identified**;
Characterize a class of counterfactual exp. that is **not identified**.
- 3 For non-identified counterfactuals, show that the “normalization” assumption can lead to serious biases.
- 4 Discuss solutions to this identification problem.

Outline

1. Model
2. Identification of Structural functions
3. Identification of Counterfactuals
4. Numerical Example
5. Solutions

1. Model

Model Variable profit

- Time is discrete and indexed by t .
- Every period t firm decide to be active in the market or not.
- $a_t \in \{0, 1\}$ indicator "active in the market at t "
- Current profit has two components: $\Pi_t = VP_t + FP_t$
- Variable profit is:

$$VP_t = a_t [vp(\mathbf{z}_t^{vp}) + \varepsilon_t^{vp}]$$

\mathbf{z}_t^{vp} and ε_t^{vp} are exog. state vars. in demand and var. costs.

- \mathbf{z}_t^{vp} is observable to the researcher, and ε_t^{vp} is unobservable.

Model Fixed Profit

- Fixed profit has three components:

$$FP_t = - a_t [fc(\mathbf{z}_t^{fc}) + \varepsilon_t^{fc}] \implies \text{Fixed Cost}$$

$$- a_t (1 - i_t) [ec(\mathbf{z}_t^{ec}) + \varepsilon_t^{ec}] \implies \text{Entry Cost}$$

$$+ (1 - a_t) i_t [sv(\mathbf{z}_t^{sv}) + \varepsilon_t^{sv}] \implies \text{Scrap value}$$

where $i_t = a_{t-1}$;

- $fc(\mathbf{z}_t^{fc}) =$ fixed cost function;
- $ec(\mathbf{z}_t^{ec}) =$ entry cost function;
- $sv(\mathbf{z}_t^{sv}) =$ scrap value function

Model Profit function

- Then, the profit function is:

$$\Pi_t = \begin{cases} vp(\mathbf{z}_t) - fc(\mathbf{z}_t) - (1 - i_t) ec(\mathbf{z}_t) + \varepsilon_t(1) & \text{if } a_t = 1 \\ i_t sv(\mathbf{z}_t) + \varepsilon_t(0) & \text{if } a_t = 0 \end{cases}$$

- $\mathbf{z}_t \equiv (\mathbf{z}_t^{vp}, \mathbf{z}_t^{fc}, \mathbf{z}_t^{ec}, \mathbf{z}_t^{sv})$
- $\varepsilon_t(1) = \varepsilon_t^{vp} - \varepsilon_t^{fc} - (1 - i_t) \varepsilon_t^{ec}; \quad \varepsilon_t(0) = -i_t \varepsilon_t^{sv}$
- For simplicity, ε_t 's are assumed independent of \mathbf{z}_t and i.i.d. over time.

Model: Bellman equation

$$V(i_t, \mathbf{z}_t, \varepsilon_t) = \max \left\{ v(0, i_t, \mathbf{z}_t) + \varepsilon_t(0) ; v(1, i_t, \mathbf{z}_t) + \varepsilon_t(1) \right\}$$

with

$$v(a_t, i_t, \mathbf{z}_t) \equiv \pi(a_t, i_t, \mathbf{z}_t) + \beta \int V(a_t, \mathbf{z}_{t+1}, \varepsilon_{t+1}) f_z(\mathbf{z}_{t+1} | \mathbf{z}_t) dG(\varepsilon_{t+1})$$

- And the optimal decision rule is:

$$\alpha(i_t, \mathbf{z}_t, \varepsilon_t) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } v(1, i_t, \mathbf{z}_t) + \varepsilon_t(1) \geq v(0, i_t, \mathbf{z}_t) + \varepsilon_t(0) \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

Model: Empirical predictions

- Define the Choice Probability:

$$P(i_t, \mathbf{z}_t) \equiv \Pr(a_t = 1 | i_t, \mathbf{z}_t)$$

- Then,

$$P(i_t, \mathbf{z}_t) = F_{\tilde{\varepsilon}}(v(1, i_t, \mathbf{z}_t) - v(0, i_t, \mathbf{z}_t))$$

- where $F_{\tilde{\varepsilon}}$ is the CDF of $\tilde{\varepsilon}_t \equiv \varepsilon_t(0) - \varepsilon_t(1)$

2. Identification: Structural functions

Identification VP and F

- Data: $\{a_{mt}, \mathbf{z}_{mt}, i_{mt}, p_{mt}, q_{mt} : t = 1, 2, \dots, T\}$.
- We assume that the variable profit function $vp(\mathbf{z}_t)$ is identified from $\{\mathbf{z}_{mt}, p_{mt}, q_{mt}\}$.
- Given independence of $\tilde{\varepsilon}_t$ and \mathbf{z}_t and large support variation of $vp(\mathbf{z}_t)$, then $F_{\tilde{\varepsilon}}$ is nonparametrically identified.

(Non) identification fc , ec , & sv

- Let $Q(i_t, \mathbf{z}_t)$ be the function that represents the value difference:
 - value of being in the market today, exiting next period, and remaining out of the market forever after that;
 - minus the value of exiting from the market today and remaining out of the market forever after that.
- $Q(i_t, \mathbf{z}_t)$ is identified.
- The following system of equations summarizes all the restrictions on functions fc , ec , and sv :

$$\begin{aligned}
 Q(i, \mathbf{z}) &= vp(\mathbf{z}) - [fc(\mathbf{z}) + ec(\mathbf{z})] + i [ec(\mathbf{z}) - sv(\mathbf{z})] \\
 &+ \beta \sum_{\mathbf{z}' \in \mathbf{Z}} f_{\mathbf{z}}(\mathbf{z}' | \mathbf{z}) sv(\mathbf{z}')
 \end{aligned}$$

(Non) identification fc , ec , & sv

PROPOSITION 2.

- $fc(\mathbf{z})$, $ec(\mathbf{z})$, and $sv(\mathbf{z})$ are not separately identified.
- But we can identify two combinations of these functions:

$$ec(\mathbf{z}) - sv(\mathbf{z}) = Q(1, \mathbf{z}) - Q(0, \mathbf{z})$$

$$fc(\mathbf{z}) + ec(\mathbf{z}) - \beta \sum_{\mathbf{z}' \in \mathbf{Z}} f_{\mathbf{z}}(\mathbf{z}' | \mathbf{z}) sv(\mathbf{z}') = -Q(0, \mathbf{z}) + vp(\mathbf{z})$$

Identification: Normalization $sv(\mathbf{z})=0$

- Under this normalization, the estimated functions $\hat{f}_c(\mathbf{z})$ and $\hat{e}_c(\mathbf{z})$ are:

$$\hat{e}_c(\mathbf{z}) = e_c(\mathbf{z}) - sv(\mathbf{z})$$

$$\hat{f}_c(\mathbf{z}) = f_c(\mathbf{z}) + \left[sv(\mathbf{z}) - \beta \sum_{\mathbf{z}' \in \mathbf{Z}} f_z(\mathbf{z}'|\mathbf{z}) sv(\mathbf{z}') \right]$$

- One should be careful when interpreting $\hat{e}_c(\mathbf{z})$ and $\hat{f}_c(\mathbf{z})$.

Identification: Normalization $f_c(z)=0$

- Under this normalization, the estimated functions $\hat{e}c(\mathbf{z})$ and $\hat{s}v(\mathbf{z})$ are:

$$\hat{e}c(\mathbf{z}) = ec(\mathbf{z}) + \sum_{r=0}^{\infty} \beta^r E [f_c(\mathbf{z}_{t+r}) \mid \mathbf{z}_t = \mathbf{z}]$$

$$\hat{s}v(\mathbf{z}) = sv(\mathbf{z}) + \sum_{r=0}^{\infty} \beta^r E [f_c(\mathbf{z}_{t+r}) \mid \mathbf{z}_t = \mathbf{z}]$$

3. Identification: Counterfactual experiments

Description of counterfactuals

- Let $\theta^0 = \{vp^0, fc^0, ec^0, sv^0, f_z^0\}$ be the values of these functions in the environment that has generated the data.
- Let $P(i, \mathbf{z}; \theta^0)$ be CCP associated to θ^0 .
- A **counterfactual experiment** is described by $\Delta_\theta = \{\Delta_{vp}(\mathbf{z}), \Delta_{fc}(\mathbf{z}), \Delta_{ec}(\mathbf{z}), \Delta_{sc}(\mathbf{z}), \Delta_{fz}(\mathbf{z})\}$ that represents a set of changes in structural functions.
- Δ_θ is known to the researcher, though some components of θ^0 and $\theta^0 + \Delta_\theta$ are unknown.

Description of counterfactuals (2)

- We want to obtain how the perturbation Δ_θ affects firms' behavior as measured by CCP function.
- Identify the $\Delta_P(i, \mathbf{z})$ associated to Δ_θ , where

$$\Delta_P(i, \mathbf{z}) \equiv P(i, \mathbf{z}; \theta^0 + \Delta_\theta) - P(i, \mathbf{z}; \theta^0)$$

- **LEMMA:** There is a one-to-one relationship between $Q(i, \mathbf{z})$ and $P(i, \mathbf{z})$.
- Therefore, $\Delta_P(i, \mathbf{z})$ **is identified iff** $\Delta_Q(i, \mathbf{z})$ is identified, where;

$$\Delta_Q(i, \mathbf{z}) \equiv Q(i, \mathbf{z}; \theta^0 + \Delta_\theta) - Q(i, \mathbf{z}; \theta^0)$$

Identified Counterfactuals

- Distinguish two components in the vector of state variables:
 $\mathbf{z} \equiv (\mathbf{z}^{nosv}, \mathbf{z}^{sv})$, where \mathbf{z}^{sv} is the subvector of the state variables that affect the scrap value:

$$f_{\mathbf{z}}(\mathbf{z}_{t+1} | \mathbf{z}_t) = f_{\mathbf{z},sv}(\mathbf{z}_{t+1}^{sv} | \mathbf{z}_t) f_{\mathbf{z},nosv}(\mathbf{z}_{t+1}^{nosv} | \mathbf{z}_t, \mathbf{z}_{t+1}^{sv}).$$

PROPOSITION 3:

- Suppose that Δ_{θ} implies changes only in functions vp , fc , ec , sv , and $f_{\mathbf{z},nosv}$ such that $\beta^* = \beta^0$ and $f_{\mathbf{z},sv}^* = f_{\mathbf{z},sv}^0$.
- And suppose that the researcher knows the perturbation $\Delta_{\theta} = \{\Delta_{vp}(\mathbf{z}), \Delta_{f_{\mathbf{z},nosv}}(\mathbf{z}' | \mathbf{z}), \Delta_{ec}(\mathbf{z}), \Delta_{sv}(\mathbf{z})\}$ (though he does not know neither θ^0 nor θ^*).
- Then, $\Delta_Q(i, \mathbf{z})$, $\Delta_P(i, \mathbf{z})$, and $P(i, \mathbf{z}; \theta^0 + \Delta_{\theta})$ are identified.

Non-identified Counterfactuals

PROPOSITION 4:

- Suppose that Δ_θ is such that $\Delta_\beta \equiv \beta^* - \beta^0 \neq 0$ or/and $\Delta_{f_{z,sv}} \equiv f_{z,sv}^* - f_{z,sv}^0 \neq 0$.
- Despite the researcher knows both (β^0, f_z^0) and (β^*, f_z^*) , the effect of these counterfactuals on firms' behavior is NOT identified.

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta_Q(i, \mathbf{z}) &= \beta^0 \sum_{\mathbf{z}^{sv'} \in \mathbf{Z}} \Delta_{f_{z,sv}}(\mathbf{z}^{sv'} | \mathbf{z}) sv^0(\mathbf{z}^{sv'}) \\ &+ \Delta_\beta \sum_{\mathbf{z}^{sv'} \in \mathbf{Z}} [f_{z,sv}^0(\mathbf{z}^{sv'} | \mathbf{z}) + \Delta_{f_{z,sv}}(\mathbf{z}^{sv'} | \mathbf{z})] sv^0(\mathbf{z}^{sv'}) \end{aligned}$$

4. Numerical Example

Numerical Example

- Consider a retail industry in which market entry requires land ownership, e.g., hotels.
- Let z_t represent land price.
- Structural functions:

$$fc(z) = fc_0 + \lambda z$$

$$ec(z) = ec_0 + z$$

$$sv(z) = sv_0 + z$$

$$z_{t+1} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 z_t + \sigma_z u_{t+1} \text{ where } u \sim iid N(0, 1)$$

$$ec_0 = 6.5, sv_0 = 0.5, fc_0 = 0.4, \lambda = 0.1, vp_0 = 1.1.$$


DGP

- There are two groups of markets in the data, e.g., two cities (regions) where each city has a large number of local markets.
- Markets in city H, and markets city L.
- All the structural functions are the same in the two cities. But this is unknown to the researcher.
- The only difference between the two cities is in the level of land price:

$$\text{City H} : z_{t+1} = 1.0 + 0.9 z_t + 0.5 u_{t+1}$$

$$\text{City L} : z_{t+1} = 0.9 + 0.9 z_t + 0.5 u_{t+1}$$


PDF Land Price: Markets type H and type L




Estimation of CCPs

- The researcher does not can estimate nonparametrically the CCPs separately for the two groups of markets.
- He finds that, for every value of land price, the CCP of entry in City H is above the one in City L.
- Similarly, for every value of land price, the CCP of staying in City H is above the one in City L.

CCP Entry: Markets type H and type L



CCP Stay: Markets type H and type L




Estimation of structural functions

- The researcher wants to understand what explains this difference in the CCPs of the two cities
- Is it differences in the f_c function, or e_c function, or sv function?
- Or is it simply the difference in the price of land?
- The truth is that the difference in the average price of land between the two cities explains the whole difference between the CCPs. But the research does not know it.
- Can he identify it from the data?


Estimate Entry Costs: Normalization $sv(z) = 0$

Estimated Entry Cost Functions Under Normalization $sv(z) = 0$




Estimate Fixed Cost: Normalization $sv(z) = 0$

Estimated Fixed Cost Functions Under Normalization $sv(z) = 0$




Estimate Entry Cost: Normalization $f_c(z) = 0$

Estimated Entry Cost Functions Under Normalization $f_c(z) = 0$



Estimate Scrap Value: Normalization $f_c(z) = 0$

Estimated Scrap Value Functions Under Normalization $f_c(z) = 0$




Counterfactual Experiment

- What is the CCPs of entry and stay in the markets of city H if the price of land (stochastic process) were the one in city L?
- 10% permanent reduction in the level of price.

	Factual	Correct CF	Estimated CF $\hat{sv}(\mathbf{z}) = 0$
Avg. Prob. Entry	0.067	0.087	0.134 [0.047]
Avg. Prob. Staying	0.950	0.963	0.978 [0.015]
Avg. Prob. Active	0.572	0.699	0.861 [0.162]


The numbers in brackets are the biases.

True & Estimated Count. Effect CCP Entry: Norm. $sv(z) = 0$




True & Estimated Count. Effect CCP Stay: Norm. $sv(z) = 0$

Difference Between Factual and Counterfactual CCP of Stay under Normalization $sv(z)=0$




True & Estimated Count. Effect CCP Entry: Norm. $fc(z) = 0$

Difference Between Factual and Counterfactual CCP of Entry under Normalization $fc(z)=0$



True & Estimated Count. Effect CCP Stay: Norm. $fc(z) = 0$



5. Solutions

Solutions

- Manski's bound approach.
 - Not very informative.
- Using data on transaction prices from the acquisition of firms.
- In some industries, a common form of firm exit (and entry) is that the owner of an incumbent firm sells all the firm's assets to a new entrant.
- Under some assumptions, these additional data can be used to deal with the identification problem that we study in this paper.